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Abstract
In this chapter, a simulation model for fragmentation risk assessment due to a
cylindrical tank explosion is presented. The proposed fragmentation methodology is
based on the application of Monte Carlo simulation and probabilistic mass method.
The probabilities of generating fragments during the explosion of the tank were
estimated regardless of the available accident data. Aleatoric and epistemic uncer-
tainty due to tank fragmentation has been identified. Generating only one fragment
is accompanied by aleatoric uncertainty. The maximum fragmentation probability
corresponds to the generation of two fragments with a total mass between 1200 kg
and 2400 kg and is 17%. The fragment shape was assessed on the basis of these data
and fracture lines. Fragmentation mechanics has shown that kinematic parameters
are accompanied by epistemic uncertainty. The range of the fragments in the
explosion of the tank has a Weibull distribution with an average value of 638m. It is
not justified to assume the initial launch angle with a uniform distribution, since its
direction is defined by the shape of the fragment. The presented methodology is
generally applicable to fragmentation problems in the process industry.
Keywords: Simulation, fragmentation, explosion, cylindrical tank, risk assessment
1. Introduction
The most common accidents with dangerous substances involve leaks, fires and
explosions [1]. If these events are an integral part of the accident chain, then they
are manifested through a domino effect [2, 3]. The main reason for fires in process
plants is the presence of flammable vapors [4]. Fires lead to heating of process
installations and increase of pressure in them creating conditions for explosions due
to BLEVE effect [5]. Explosions of process equipment due to the domino effect
imply a pronounced fragmentation effect [6]. Fragmentation action in the accident
chain (domino effect) is characterized by the fact that it is both a cause and a
consequence of explosions [7]. The fragmentation effect during the explosion of the
tank is accompanied by a very pronounced uncertainty of geometric and kinematic
parameters of the fragments [8]. Large-scale accidents that have occurred in recent
times are the result of progressive technological developments, and the typical
examples are Toulouse [9] and Neyshabur [10]. Fragmentation barriers are used as
a form of protection against the fragmentation effect [11, 12]. The fragmentation
effect and the mechanism of formation during the explosion of the tank are
presented in [13]. The literature recognizes the basic geometric characteristics as
the number and shape of fragments, and defines the kinematic parameters through
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the trajectory and velocity of the fragments [14]. An initial procedure for estimating
the number and mass of a fragment of a LPG storage tank was proposed by Baker
et al. [15]. This research served as a starting point for some recent studies in the field
of tank fragmentation [16, 17]. Tank fragmentation analysis should identify poten-
tial hazards and risks in terms of protecting process equipment from accident
escalation [18]. Fragmentation barriers are used as protection against the fragmen-
tation effect and were originally used in nuclear plants [19]. There are several
models in the literature according to which the impact energy of a fragment into the
target zone is estimated based on the fragment velocity [20–22]. Accident data show
that two or three fragments are usually formed during tank fragmentation [23]. It
has been determined that the distinct presence of fire during the fragmentation of
the tank usually gives one fragment [24]. Previous research for the number of
generated fragments estimation has exclusively used the maximum entropy model
[25]. This model is based on accident data and shows that explosions with more than
five generated fragments are very rare accidents [26, 27].
Tank explosions with the BLEVE effect very rarely provide more than three
generated fragments [28]. The implementation of the maximum entropy model is
possible only if there are available accident data for this type of process equipment
[29]. Fragmentation mechanics analyzes the flight of a fragment and for that pur-
pose the literature sources state a simplified mathematical model [30]. This model is
represented in all recent research and was originally proposed by Mannan [31].
Greater mass of the fragment corresponded to the higher initial kinetic energy or
the initial velocity [32]. Risk assessment due to the action of fragments is very often
estimated in the literature on the basis of kinetic energy of fragments [33]. This
energy is usually defined by the percentage share of expansion energy [34]. Some
recommendations suggest that this percentage ranges between 5% and 20% [35].
This procedure of determining the initial velocities of the fragments has significant
deviations from the real values, so it can only be used for general estimation. The
aerodynamic properties of the fragments have a great influence on its kinematic
parameters and are reflected in the uncertainty of the shape [36]. Djelosevic and
Tepic conducted a complex study of cylindrical tank fragmentation in terms of
identifying aleatoric and epistemic uncertainty [37, 38]. The same authors
established a correlation of geometric and kinematic parameters of fragments,
stating the importance of simulation technique in fragmentation analysis. This
chapter will present a general methodological framework for the study of tank
fragmentation under the conditions of the BLEVE effect, which is characteristic of
the gas industry [39]. The focus of this research is on the analysis of types of
uncertainty that follow fragmentation parameters with special reference to fracture
probabilities and elimination of conditions that introduce influential fragment sizes
into the zone of epistemic uncertainty [40].
2. Fragmentation methodology
Tank fragmentation implies physical separation of fragments from the tank con-
struction itself. The basic feature of fragments is the kinetic energy they have just
before hitting a target. Greater kinetic energy of the impact creates greater potential
hazard as a result of the fragmentation effect of the explosion. Assessing the kinetic
energy of fragments is a complex task which requires identification of geometric and
kinematic parameters. The basic geometric parameters are the shape and mass of
fragments, whereas the most important kinematic parameter is the initial velocity of
a fragment. Geometric and kinematic parameters are not independent since the shape
of a fragment affects its initial velocity and initial launch direction. Literature
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resources on the assessment of geometric and kinematic parameters of fragments are
scarce. Therefore, the assessment of these parameters in this paper was conducted
using probabilistic and simulation techniques. The probabilistic approach will first be
presented and thereafter the simulation analysis of fragmentation.
2.1 Probabilistic approach
The probabilistic approach is used for the assessment of fragment shapes, num-
ber of generated fragments as well as for the identifaction of aleatoric and epistemic
uncertainty. The effect of uncertainty in assessing geometric and kinematic param-
eters is extremely important because if a parameter has the same or approximately
the same probability with the change of influential factors, then it is definitely
accompanied by aleatoric uncertainty. Aleatoric uncertainty is typical of those
parameters whose uncertainty cannot be eliminated. On the other hand, there is
epistemic uncertainty. If a parameter has epistemic uncertainty, that kind of uncer-
tainty can be eliminated by additional research procedures and the parameter can
be subjected to deterministic principles. A typical example of epistemic uncertainty
is the initial launch angle of a fragment. Literature resources show that any angle
value has the same probability of occurence and thus this parameter is introduced
into the zone of aleatoric uncertainty. We will show that this is not justified and that
the intitial launch angle of a fragment is defined by the shape of the fragment, i.e.
by potential fracture lines of a tank.
Probabilistic analysis of influential fragmentation factors is an efficient way of
distinguishing between epistemic and aleatoric uncertainty. The probabilistic
approach is based on the use of the probabilistic mass method which was originally
developed by Djelosevic and Tepic [37, 38]. The main purpose of this method is the
assessment of tank fragmentation probabilities on the basis of ideal values and the
mass factor. Ideal fragmentation probabilities are assessed using statistical simula-
tion on a sufficient number of samples. The precondition for a sufficient number of
statistical samples is clear convergence of results, which, in this case, is achieved
with more than 100,000 samples. Ideal fragmentation probabilities were obtained
under the assumption of uniform stress state and strength (homogeneity) of the
material. Ideal fragmentation probabilities are those that correspond to the explo-
sion of a tank with a uniform stress state, and the values that refer to the specific
number of generated fragments are presented in Table 1.
Since the actual stress state of a tank is not uniform, the ideal fragmentation
probabilities have to be corrected. The correction factor used is the so-called mass
factor (fmass) which represents the ratio between the mass of the part of the tank with
the non-uniform stress state and the total mass of the tank. Mass factor values for
typical cylindrical tanks with torispherical end caps range between 0.55 and 0.75.
Greater values indicate greater uniformity of the stress state and vice versa. The
effect of fire contributes to greater non-uniformity so the mass factor in this case has
lower values. The assessment of mass factors requires division of the tank into
segments. Cylindrical tanks should be devided into three segments irrespective of
their construction type and size. The first segment comprises the cylindrical part
between the supports and it is defined by length L (S1) according to Figure 1. The
other two segments (S2 and S3) comprise the parts of the tank outside the supports
Number of fragments 1 2 3 4 5 6 ≥ 7
The probability of ideal fragmentation 1/2 1/3 1/8 1/30 1/150 1/800 5/12000
Table 1.
Ideal tank fragmentation probabilities.
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and their lengths amount to [L – L(S1)]/2. Tank fracture can occur in individual
segments (either S1 or S2 or S3) or in at least two segments (S1 and S2 or S1 and S3 or
S2 and S3) or in all three segments (S1 and S2 and S3). Depending on the mentioned
scenarios, fracture probabilities and conditional fracture probabilities resulting from
tank fragmentation are derived. Fracture probabilities are associated with tank frag-
mentation within only one segment (either S1 or S2 or S3). Conditional fracture
probabilities comprise fragments which were generated from at least two segments.
Fracture probabilities and conditional fracture probabilities according to the
number of fragments are given in Table 2.
Conditional fracture probabilities for individual fragmentation scenarios (Sc1 …
Sc8) were obtained on the basis of fracture probabilities values for segments S1, S2
and S3. This way the probabilistic mass method enabled easy assessment of fracture
probabilities according to the number of generated fragments. The literature on the
subject usually mentions the entropic model for this purpose where deviation of
about 50% for the probability of the third fragment is observed. The entropic model
is based on accident data fitting, whereas the probabilistic mass method is indepen-
dent of accident data. A comparative analysis of fracture probabilities according to
the number of generated fragments for the entropic model, the probabilistic mass
method and accident data is presented in Figure 2.
Figure 1.







Conditional probability of fracture S1 if there is damage to
segments S2 and/or S3 [%]
S1 S2 S3 Sc1 Sc2 Sc3 Sc4 Sc5 Sc6 Sc7 Sc8
ONE (1) 35.500 6.250 6.250 32.959 2.197 2.197 0.146 54.932 3.662 3.662 0.244
27.500 11.250 11.250 21.661 2.746 2.746 0.348 57.105 7.239 7.239 0.918
TWO (2) 25.000 4.167 4.167 22.960 0.998 0.998 0.043 68.880 2.995 2.995 0.130
18.333 7.500 7.500 15.686 1.272 1.272 0.103 69.876 5.666 5.666 0.459
THREE (3) 9.375 1.563 1.563 9.084 0.144 0.144 0.002 87.815 1.394 1.394 0.022
6.875 2.813 2.813 6.494 0.188 0.188 0.005 87.960 2.545 2.545 0.074
FOUR (4) 2.500 0.417 0.417 2.479 0.010 0.010 0.000 96.689 0.405 0.405 0.002
1.833 0.750 0.750 1.806 0.014 0.014 0.000 96.700 0.731 0.731 0.006
FIVE (5) 0.500 0.083 0.083 0.499 0.000 0.000 0.000 99.334 0.083 0.083 0.000
0.367 0.150 0.150 0.366 0.001 0.001 0.000 99.335 0.149 0.149 0.000
SIX (6) 0.094 0.016 0.016 0.094 0.000 0.000 0.000 99.875 0.016 0.016 0.000
0.069 0.028 0.028 0.069 0.000 0.000 0.000 99.875 0.028 0.028 0.000
SEVEN (7) 0.013 0.002 0.002 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.000 99.983 0.002 0.002 0.000
0.009 0.004 0.004 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.000 99.983 0.004 0.004 0.000
≥ EIGHT
(8)
0.019 0.003 0.003 0.019 0.000 0.000 0.000 99.975 0.003 0.003 0.000
0.014 0.006 0.006 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.000 99.975 0.006 0.006 0.000
Table 2.
Fracture probabilities and conditional fracture probabilities of tank fragmentation.
Figure 2.
Comparative analysis of fracture probabilities.
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2.2 Fracture scenarios
Fracture scenarios of fragmentation in tank explosions imply a qualitative and
quantitative analysis which is performed using Failure Tree Analysis (FTA). The
triggering event that leads to tank fragmentation is reaching the critical pressure.
The major central events are fractures of segments 1, 2 and 3. Qualitative analysis
offers eight potential scenarios (Sc1 … Sc8). All the scenarios imply tank fragmen-
tation apart from scenario Sc5 which excludes the possibility of tank fracture when
the critical pressure is reached. Quantitative analysis implies the assessment of
fracture probabilities and conditional fracture probabilities. These probabilities
were assessed by means of Monte Carlo simulation using the probabilistic mass
method, and they are presented in Table 2.
A significant part of this research deals with the assessment of the mass of
fragments generated during tank explosion. For that purpose, the mass of
fragments is expressed via the percent share of the empty tank mass which
amounts to 12.3 t. Simulation results with over 100,000 samples show that
fragments whose sum of masses ranges between 10% and 20% of the empty tank
have the greatest generation probability. In this concrete case, the mass of frag-
ments is between 1,230 kg and 2,460 kg. The maximum fragmentation probability is
observed when two fragments are generated in an explosion and it amounts to
around 17%.
Generation of fragments with small mass (smaller than 1% of the total mass of
the tank) and generation of more than six fragments are extremely rare. The
distribution of probabilities for the generated fragments depending on their mass is
presented in Figure 3.
The probabilities of generation of only one fragment for different masses have
uniform distribution, which points to aleatoric uncertainty. This means that the
shape and mass of only one fragment generated in an explosion cannot be predicted
Figure 3.
Distribution of probabilities for fragments with different mass.
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with certainty. On the other hand, generation of two or more fragments is accom-
panied by epistemic uncertainty. This means that with adequately used methodol-
ogy, the mass and shape of two or more generated fragments can be predicted with
certainty with the probabilities shown in Figure 3.
2.3 The assessment of shape and mass of fragments
The assessment of mass and shapes of fragments requires defining fracture lines,
i.e. the lines along which tank fracture occurs. Fracture lines are zones of
pronounced stress of the material and are the result of different construction con-
ditions. Definition of fracture lines implies prior pressure analysis. In this case, the
analysis was performed using the ANSYS software for the operating pressure of
16.7 bar. Fracture lines can spread in those zones whose pressure exceeds 130 MPa.
Accordingly, the investigated cylindrical tank has a total of 13 typical areas from
which tank fragments can be generated (Figure 4). The most pronounced stress of
the tank is on the transition from the cylinder to the end caps of the tank. This is the
reason why during an explosion a fragment containing a larger or smaller part of the
end cap is almost always generated.
Tank fragmentation is most often accompanied by generation of one, two or
sometimes three fragments. Their typical shapes, mass, fracture zones and genera-
tion probabilities are given in Table 3. The most probable scenario in tank explosion
is the one with the generation of two fragments with the sum of masses of around
1,200 kg or 2,255 kg.
Figure 4.
Stress state of the tank with fracture lines.
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3. Fragmentation mechanics
Fragmentation mechanics involves modeling the flight of fragments created by a
tank explosion. The basic characteristics of the fragments include geometric and
kinematic parameters. We identified the geometric parameters in Section 2 of this
chapter and they include number, mass and shape of the generated fragments. The
main kinematic parameters include the initial velocity and the initial direction of
the fragment launch. The literature does not provide information on the
distribution of the range of fragments.
Therefore, it is not justified to assume that the range of the fragments is accompa-
nied by a random distribution. Also, it is not justified to introduce assumptions about
the uniformity of kinematic parameters of the fragments, just because we do not have
enough available information about their behavior. Assuming a uniform distribution
for some of the kinematic parameters, we enter an area of aleatoric uncertainty that
does not allow an adequate assessment of fragmentation risk. The authors of this
chapter start from the assumption that the generation of fragments does not follow a
stochastic process, thus putting epistemic uncertainty in the foreground.
3.1 Fragment flight model
The flight of the fragment takes place under the influence of inertial, gravita-
tional and aerodynamic forces (air resistance and lift force). The trajectory of the
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The flight of each of the fragments should be observed in the local coordinate
system Oxyz and then the projections of the vector differential Eq. (1) read:








ay,fr ¼ _vy,fr ¼ 0 (5)








Practically, the flight of the fragment is completely described by (4), (5) and
(6), since there is no motion in the direction of the y-axis (that is why we observed
the motion in the local coordinate system). The Taylor’s series method was used to
solve the coupled system of nonlinear differential equations. The ratio of the veloc-
ity components initially defines the initial launch angle of the fragment (Figure 5).
This simply proves that the initial launch angle is not accompanied by a stochastic
distribution.
3.2 Initial conditions
The initial conditions define the kinematic parameters at the initial moment (at
the moment of the tank explosion). These conditions are necessary for initiating the
procedure of numerical solution of differential equations and read:
xfr t0ð Þ ¼ x0∧ zfr t0ð Þ ¼ z0 (7)
vx,fr t0ð Þ ¼ vxo ∧ vz,fr t0ð Þ ¼ vzo (8)
_vx,fr t0ð Þ ¼ axo ∧ _vz,fr t0ð Þ ¼ azo (9)
Figure 5.
Kinematic parameters due to tank fragmentation.
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These values are used as the first step in the numerical procedure and they are of
unknown magnitude at the moment. At this level we know that the initial velocity is
not independent of the initial acceleration of the fragments. The components of





















The direction of the fragment velocity can be determined at any time during the














 az þ g
h i (12)
In order to obtain the initial launch angle of a fragment, it is necessary to know
the components of the initial acceleration. In the continuation of this chapter, we
show how the initial acceleration occurs. It is important to point out that (12) shows
an unjustified assumption about the uniformity of the initial acceleration. Thus, the
initial launch angle as a kinematic parameter is classified in the category of episte-
mic uncertainty. Literature sources in this area do not use the initial acceleration
parameter, although it is a way to remove uncertainty regarding a reliable
fragmentation risk assessment.
3.3 Defining the initial acceleration
We have previously came to the conclusion that in order to define the initial
velocity and the initial launch angle of a fragment, it is necessary to know the initial
acceleration. Hence the idea and justification for introducing this kinematic param-
eter into fragmentation analysis. The initial acceleration is proportional to the force
of pressure on the fragment. This force is created by the critical pressure pcr acting
on the inner surface of the fragment. The proportion of explosive energy trans-
ferred to the fragment is limited by the action of critical pressure. This means that
the proportion of explosive energy of the fragment transferred to the fragment
depends on the tensile strength of the material.
The procedure for determining the initial acceleration is based on this assump-
tion. The lower tensile strength gives less initial kinetic energy of the fragment.
Fragment generation occurs when the von Mises’s stress reaches a critical value





θ  σxσθ þ
3
2
σx  σθð Þ
2
r
¼ 102  pcr (13)
Where the corresponding components of the von Mises’s stress are given by:
σx ¼ 101  pcr




Separation of fragments from the tank as a whole occurs when the critical stress
reaches the value of tensile strength of the material fm, so the critical pressure is












This proves that the initial acceleration has a constant value for a certain type of
steel from which the tank is made. LPG transport and storage tanks have a constant
wall thickness of 14 mm. The density of steel ρ is also constant and amounts to
7850 kg/m3.
Thus, by knowing the initial acceleration, we are able to define the initial veloc-
ity and the initial launch angle, as well as all other kinematic parameters at any time
during the flight of the fragment. It should be borne in mind that the initial accel-
eration depends on the tensile strength of the material whose values are subject to
variation with temperature changes. The change in the influence values on the
range of the fragment is given in Table 4.
3.4 Fragments range
Based on a mathematical model that describes the flight of the fragment and the
initial acceleration, we are able to determine the range of the fragments. For this
purpose, all geometric and kinematic parameters will be classified into two groups.
The first group consists of invariant parameters and their value is fixed. The second
group consists of variable parameters, ie those whose value changes during the
flight of the fragment. This group includes the coefficients of aerodynamic and
thrust acceleration kL and kD. The invariant parameters are fully defined and their
value is not subject to variation during the flight of the fragment (tank wall thick-
ness, tensile strength and specific weight of the material). Variable parameters
change during the flight of the fragment due to the rotation of the fragment or some
other effects. Variable parameters are defined via the air resistance coefficient CD
and the thrust coefficient CL.
The literature gives approximate values of these coefficients which depend on
the shape of the fragment. Smaller fragments whose mass does not exceed a few
hundred kilograms generally have the shape of a shell (shells are aerodynamic
shapes), so they have a pronounced thrust effect. In order to estimate the range of
the fragments, the fluctuation of variable parameters is performed, whereby dif-
ferent trajectories of the fragments are obtained. These trajectories enable the
definition of the limit values of the coefficients kL and kD. Parabolic trajectories of
Parameter Temperature [0C]
20 200 400 500 600 800 900
Tensile strength Rm [MPa] 500 469 373 252 117 23 11
Critical pressure pcr[bar] 48.5 45.5 36.2 24.5 11.4 2.2 1.1
Initial acceleration a0[m/s
2] 43,746 41,034 32,635 22,048 10,237 2,012 962
Initial velocity v0[m/s] 1,985 1,923 1,715 1,409 960 426 294
Average range Ravg[m] 395.6 394.3 389.3 380.0 359.1 303.1 272.2
Table 4.
Temperature influence on the influence values of the fragment range.
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small height (fragment reaches small range and small height) as well as pointed
trajectories (fragments reach large height and relatively small range) are very rare
and represent boundary cases for the selection of coefficients kL and kD.
Fragment range estimation was realized by Monte Carlo simulation by processing
240 different samples for different fragmentation parameters. Fragments of up to a
few hundred kilograms launched at an angle of up to 350 can be adequately
represented by the Weibull’s distribution with parameters 2.3 and 723.8 as shown
in Figure 6.
The maximum probability of 6.5% corresponds to fragments with a range
between 613 m and 663 m. This means that 6.5% of the total number of generated
fragments will fall to the target between these distances.
4. Fragmentation simulation model
The basic questions that are asked in the simulation model of fragmentation are
related to the assessment of fragmentation density and sector angle. Fragmentation
density refers to the number of fragments whose range will correspond to an area.
The sector angle refers to the most common angle in the horizontal plane at which
the fragments will burst due to the explosion of the tank. The simulation model of
fragmentation is based on the research given in Sections 2 and 3.
4.1 Assessment of fragmentation density
The density of fragments is estimated based on the results of fragmentation
mechanics for different trajectories, masses and shapes of fragments. Assessment of
fragment density requires the definition of appropriate distribution functions
depending on the mass, the initial launch angle of the fragment and the limit values
of the coefficients kL i kD. The considered masses of fragments are in the range from
200 kg to 200 kg, while the initial angles take values from 50 to 350. The
characteristic density functions for the defined parameters are given in Table 5.
Figure 6.
Distribution of the range of typical shaped fragments.
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4.2 Sector angle assessment
The sector angle is the angle in the horizontal plane under which the fragment is
launched. The explosion of the cylindrical tanks is accompanied by the generation
of fragments from segments 1, 2 and 3 according to Figure 1. If the fragments
belong only to segment 1, then their bursting is done exclusively in the axial
direction. If the fragments belong only to segments 2 and 3, then the scattering of
the fragments takes place in the action direction. In practice, the most common
cases are when we have the generation of fragments from segments 1 and 2 or 1 and
3. Therefore, the first step in assessment the sector angle is to define the fragmen-
tation probabilities by tank segments. For this purpose, the results on fracture and
conditional fracture probabilities presented in Section 2 are used. Limit values of
fragmentation probabilities by the number of generated fragments are given in
Table 6.









The condition should be added to the previous formula: α + β = π/2, where pf is
the fragmentation probability of the tank corresponding to the first segment (S1).
Mass Init.
ang.







0] kD,min kD,max kL,min kLmax a b
200 15 60 150 0 30 Rayleigh 264.436 —
500 15 50 80 0 22 Weibull 4.150 667.458
500 25 50 80 0 20 Gamma 10.978 51.535
800 5 40 80 0 25 Rayleigh 486.687 —
800 15 40 70 0 21 Log Normal 671.079 212.938
1350 5 39 60 0 16 Gamma 11.678 64.910
1350 15 39 60 0 15 Log Normal 802.359 228.446
1350 35 35 59 0 13 Weibull 2.984 773.223
2000 15 31 55 0 16 Weibull 2.910 890.345
Table 5.
Fragmentation densities for characteristic fragments.
Segment Value Fragmentation probability (pf) for the number of generated fragments
[%]
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ≥ 8























































Fragmentation probabilities by number of generated fragments.
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Sectoral angle Value Sectoral angle (2α and 2β) for the number of generated fragments






































Sector angles by number of fragments generated.
Figure 7.
Burst simulation with risk matrix.
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Sector area 2α covers fragmentation zones in which fragments generated predomi-
nantly from the cylindrical part of the tank are located (S1). Sector angle 2β covers
the area corresponding to the fragments generated from segments 2 and 3 (S2 i S3).
Sector angles by number of generated fragments are given in Table 7.
5. Risk assessment
The risk assessment is the final phase of the fragmentation analysis due to the
explosion of the LPG tank. Defining fracture probabilities, shape and mass of
fragments, as well as kinematic parameters are the basis for defining fragmentation
density and sector angles. The fragmentation risk assessment is performed based on
the results given in Section 4. Research has shown that the fragmentation effect of a
50,000-liter tank can endanger objects and people at distances greater than 1,000
meters. Therefore, fragmentation stands out as the dominant hazard versus shock
wave and thermal effect during tank explosion. Fragmentation risk assessment is
carried out by dividing the area around the focus of the accident into quadrants
measuring 200  200 meters within which the number of fragments is observed.
A larger number of fragments gives a higher fragmentation risk and vice versa.
The fragmentation risk analysis is given for the limit values of the mass factor (0.55
and 0.75), so we obtain the limit values of the fragmentation risk. For example, for
quadrant D1 we have that the limit values of fragmentation risk are 5.24% and
4.91%, which gives an average value of 5.08%. Although there is a significant
deviation between the limit values of the mass factor (0.55 and 0.75), based on the
appropriate risk matrices, we can conclude that the deviation of the limit values of
fragmentation risk is only a few percent. This indicates that the presented method-
ology based on the identification of uncertainties provides convergent and reliable
solutions in the assessment of fragmentation risk. Simulations of fragment bursting
as well as risk matrices are shown in Figure 7.
6. Conclusions
In this chapter, a fragmentation simulation model for risk assessment due to the
explosion of a cylindrical tank is presented. According to the literature, fragmenta-
tion models exclusively use accident data. In addition, parameters for which there is
insufficient information available are assumed with a uniform distribution. These
are the main shortcomings of existing fragmentation models. These shortcomings
have been remedied by applying the proposed fragmentation model. The simulation
of fragment scattering is considered through the issue of uncertainty in the estima-
tion of geometric and kinematic parameters. Fracture probabilities were estimated
without available accident data for the considered tank type. Fragmentation
mechanics enabled the definition of characteristic trajectories and the definition of
limit values for coefficients kL i kD. Introducing the initial acceleration into the
analysis, we came to know about the correlation of certain geometric and kinematic
parameters of the fragment. Most of the influential parameters are accompanied by
epistemic uncertainty, so the initial velocity cannot be estimated on the basis of the
explosive energy of the tank, nor can the initial launch angle of the fragment be
assumed by a stochastic distribution. Fragments weighing up to a few hundred
kilograms are best represented by the Weibull distribution, and the most probable
range of the fragments is between 670 m and 680 m. The risk matrix is given per
square meter for an area of 4 km2.The probability of impact of the fragment in the
base target of 10 m2 is from 1.6105 to 2.1105.
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Nomenclature
D External diameter of the tank (D = 2600 mm)
h Height of the elliptic head (h = 650 mm)
δ Wall thickness of the tank (δ = 14 mm)
p Operating pressure of the tank (p = 16.7 MPa)
σx Longitudinal stress of the tank
σθ Circumference stress of the tank
a0 Initial acceleration of the fragment
F The inertial force of the fragment
ρ Density of steel S355J2G3 (ρ = 7850 kg/m3)
pcr Critical tank pressure
fm Tensile strength of steel S355J2G3
mfr Mass of the fragment
WD Force of air resistance during flight of the fragment
WL Lifting force of the fragment
G Gravitational force (G = mfrg, g = 9,81 m/s
2)
ρair Air density (ρair = 1.20 kg/m
3)
CD Coefficient of force of air resistance
CL Coefficient of lift force
AD The area of the frontal projection of the fragment
AL The area of the lateral projection of the fragment
vfr Velocity of the fragment
afr Acceleration of the fragment
kD Coefficient of drag acceleration
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